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ABSTRACT 
Previous research suggests that the processing of affordances may require more 
perceptually relevant information than words can provide (Surber et al., 2018; Chainay & 
Humphreys, 2002). The present study investigates this hypothesis with the shoebox task 
used in Bowers and Turner (2003). A list of 81 object nouns (targets) and associated 
features (primes: affordance, semantic, and non-associates) was compiled from the 
McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, and McNorgan (2005) norms. Affordances denote possibilities 
for action in relation to the object (e.g. chair – sit), whereas semantic features indicate 
definitional characteristics (e.g. chair – has legs). Affordances and semantic features 
served as primes in the present experiments. Primes were presented as words in all 
experiments. Participants decided if primes and targets could fit inside of a shoebox 
across three experiments. Experiment 1 presented target objects as words (i.e. the name 
of the object) or photographs (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010). 
Experiment 2 presented target objects as photographs degraded by 1 of 3 levels (clear, 
medium blur, maximum blur). Experiment 3 presented target objects as photographs that 
began degraded and slowly became clear. Results for Experiments 1 and 2 showed a 
significant priming effect for affordances (i.e. affordance primed objects were responded 
to faster than objects primed with non-associate, as well as a significant effect of 
accuracy for affordance primed objects. Experiment 3 results showed a marginally 
significant effect of prime type on reaction time. These results are consistent with the 
idea that affordance perception is optimized for real-world stimuli. 
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CHAPTER I - Introduction 
Interacting with an object in the environment is achieved by perceiving 
possibilities for action (i.e., affordances, Gibson, 2014). Our actions are mediated by an 
actor’s capabilities and the environmental constraints imposed on the actor. Gibson 
argued that this process involves the pickup of meaningful information from the 
environment. Through repeated interactions with various objects and environments, an 
actor will begin to store a record of these interactions. This process helps the actor learn 
and form memories about their environment. Semantic memory, the storehouse of 
knowledge for what a person knows about the world (Balota & Coane, 2008), plays a 
crucial role in this process. This knowledge is gathered throughout one’s life, and 
includes facts about the world, the meaning of words, one’s ideas, and the concept of 
objects. Given affordances are essential for everyday functioning and behavior, 
affordance features should be distinct from, and perhaps even more salient than, semantic 
features of objects.  
Supporting the claim that affordance features are processed differently from 
semantic features, recent research has shown that there may be a separate memory 
process for action features (Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). Research on patients with brain 
impairments has shown that patients can use an object without having semantic 
knowledge of the object (Hodges, Bozeat, Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000; Silveri & 
Ciccarelli, 2009). Silveri and Ciccarelli (2009) investigated whether patients with mild to 
severe semantic memory impairment were able to recognize and/or use objects. The 
authors concluded that when semantic memory deficits are mild, non-declarative forms of 
memory such as procedural-motor memory can support and compensate the patient’s 
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ability to act. However, it is important to note that semantic memory and procedural-
motor memory interact. This can be seen in patients with severe neurological deficits, as 
they are unable to complete tasks that involve functional use of objects.  
1.1 Theories of Semantic Processing 
In order to investigate the potential differences between affordance features and 
semantic features, I need to first review the literature on theories of semantic processing. 
The network approach was developed by Quillian (1968), and further improved upon by 
Collins and Loftus (1975). The main feature of this approach is that semantic knowledge 
is embedded within a network structure and is linked by association. This model posits 
that related concepts are organized closer together in the network than unrelated 
concepts. The alternative approach called the Feature Analytic Theory developed by 
Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974) focuses on defining and characteristic features. Defining 
features are the necessary features of exemplars or prototypes of a category, whereas 
characteristic features are shared features of most exemplars. It is still unclear what is the 
nature of these representations, and how they are formed. Regardless, there might be 
some evidence for using the sensorimotor system as a grounding for semantic memory 
representations.  
Barsalou (1999) posited a link between sensorimotor systems and semantic 
memory with his theory of Perceptual Symbol Systems. According to Barsalou (1999) 
information is picked up from the environment via several different modalities and 
processing systems: The sensory system (i.e., sight, haptic), the motor system (i.e., 
actions), kinesthetic system (i.e., object manipulation), proprioceptive systems (i.e., 
internal feedback system), emotional systems (i.e., happy, fear), the cognitive systems 
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(i.e., language processing), and the perceptual system (i.e., affordance processing). The 
information gathered from modalities is processed in their respective memory system 
(i.e., visual memory). The information is then integrated together in association areas. 
Retrieving from semantic memory involves a simulator, in which neural activation at 
encoding becomes reinstated.  
 Siakaluk, Pexman, Aguilera, Owen, and Sears (2008a) used perceptual symbol 
systems as the theoretical model for a word recognition task. In their experiment, body-
object interaction (BOI), the ease with which someone could physically interact with the 
referent of the word, was used as the measure of sensorimotor knowledge. Participants 
engaged in a Lexical Decision Task (LDT) comparing high BOI words with low BOI 
words. They found a facilitatory effect of BOI with high BOI words being recognized 
faster than low BOI words. The authors explained this using the feedback activation 
framework of visual word recognition (Hino & Lupker, 1996). The high BOI words had 
richer semantic representations which provided stronger feedback activation to 
orthography and phonology, facilitating reaction times. It is therefore possible that 
affordances may have high BOI value due to rich action-related content and which in turn 
would be processed faster than low BOI words. 
  Siakaluk et al. (2008b) followed up their experiment by looking at BOI and direct 
semantic processing. Experiment 1A and 1B consisted of a semantic categorization task 
(SCT) in which participants decided whether words were easily imageable (1A) or not 
easily imageable (1B). Imageability was defined as the ease with which a word can 
produce a mental image. Across experiments reaction times and accuracy were greater 
for high BOI versus low BOI words. Experiment 2 involved a semantic lexical decision 
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task (SLDT) where participants first made a lexical decision followed by an imageability 
response. Again, BOI effects were detected and these were even larger than Experiment 
1, further supporting the notion that high BOI can promote semantic processing.  
 In a subsequent study, Wellsby, Siakaluk, Owen, and Pexman (2011) evaluated 
the possibility that BOI facilitation was due to the motor system speeding key presses 
versus semantic activation. To test this priming hypothesis, the authors used three go/no-
go semantic categorization tasks: A button press condition, a pronunciation condition, 
and a verbal condition, and participants were asked to respond to words that were 
imageable. Across tasks, the BOI facilitation effect was found, providing evidence for 
embodied cognition and against the motor priming hypothesis. 
1.2 Affordances and Semantic Processing 
Gibson (1979) theorized that all the sense organs can pick up the same 
information from the environment using different forms of stimulus energy. This suggests 
that if a sensory organ is relevant for a given behavior, it will perceive some form of 
environmental information to aid in the actualization of the affordance. By picking up 
this information an actor can perform successful actions within their environment. Each 
animal forms a unique relationship with the environment due to different intrinsic metrics 
(i.e., eye height, strength, motor functioning, etc.) relevant to only that specific animal 
and task. In this way, a unique link is established between actor and environment. 
Perceptual systems are suited to perceive relational properties (animal-environment 
relationship) that fulfill meaningful actions. This animal-environment relationship 
implies that the animal must be aware of its own capabilities, as well as the environment 
and its features to accurately perceive what it can do in a given situation. At the center of 
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the relationship between the environment and the actor are the sensory and perceptual 
systems. This leads to one important implication, that perception and cognition function 
to process affordances and guide actions (Wilson 2002). 
There are several affordance tasks that have been used by researchers. Wagman, 
Thomas, McBride and Day (2013) had participants make maximum reaching height 
judgements with or without the aid of objects (a stick and a stepstool). Participants made 
these decisions when objects were both present and absent from their view. For absent 
objects participants had to rely on their memory of the object while making their 
decisions. They found that participants were able to make accurate judgements of their 
reaching ability regardless of whether the object was present or absent. The authors 
concluded that this is due to the nature of affordance perception and memory according to 
the ecological perspective. Specifically, that perception and memory are not wholly 
distinct. These processes have a nested structure that act together to guide behaviors, and 
the two processes are best thought of as lying on two ends of the same continuous 
spectrum belonging to the same cognitive process.  
Thomas and Riley (2014) expanded upon these results in two experiments. 
Experiment 1 replicated the results from Wagman et al. (2013), showing that participants 
were able to make accurate reaching judgements regardless of whether the stick was 
present or absent. Experiment 2 asked participants to make aperture pass-through-ability 
judgements (i.e., the minimum distance between two surfaces that afford passing 
through) while holding a stick. The stick was held in their right hand perpendicular to 
their body, making it harder to pass through smaller apertures. Participants were also 
asked to estimate the length of the stick used for reaching. The results again show that 
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participants can make accurate affordance judgements regardless of whether participants 
were able to view the aid object (stick) or whether they had to remember its affordances. 
Further analysis compared affordance judgements with a lower-order metric judgement 
computed by combining perceived stick length with perceived abilities without aid. They 
found that participants’ judgements were more accurate when participants were making 
action relevant decisions compared to action neutral decisions (i.e., stick length). The 
authors concluded that I perceive and interpret our environment based on action relevant 
criteria instead of lower-order properties such as metric length. This is evidence that 
affordance may be the most meaningful feature of an object compared to other semantic 
features.  
Thomas and Riley (2015) manipulated action neutral properties of objects and had 
participants make decisions of maximum reachability. Specifically, they manipulated the 
mass and rotational inertia of two different rods, of the same length, used to aid in 
reachability. Participants made reachability judgements with both rods. Once participants 
had made their reaching judgements (with and without aid), participants were asked to 
report the heaviness of the two rods. This was done to determine if participants would 
remember action-neutral properties not relevant to the given task. Participants reported no 
differences in the affordance judgements between rods, which is not surprising given that 
both rods were the same length. This was true even when rods were absent from view and 
participants were required to remember affordance properties of the rod. The rod length 
judgements showed no difference in their reported weights. This is further evidence that 
perception and possibly memory, focuses on the action-relevant properties of objects that 
aid actions.  
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Another important cognitive process alongside memory is categorization. It is an 
open question whether categorization is based on affordance properties of objects, tools 
and tasks. There is empirical evidence showing that I categorize the surrounding 
environment through affordances available within the space. For instance, Greene, 
Baldassano, Esteva, Beck, and Fei-Fei (2014) presented participants with a scene (i.e., 
kitchen), and then asked which of 3 comparison scenes had the most in common with the 
target room. For example, if participants are shown a picture of a modern-day kitchen 
scene and asked which of three scenes (kitchen supply store, modern day laundry, 
medieval kitchen) is most similar to the presented pictures. The authors found that 
affordance-based similarities predicted which selection was most likely to be chosen by 
participants. What this means is that if any of the three scenes shared any functions with 
the presented scene, it was most likely to be selected over the others. This was compared 
to more traditional explanations of visual scene categorization such as visual features and 
objects. The authors concluded that this provides evidence for scene categorization based 
on affordances, which is another example of the perceptual systems interacting with 
semantic memory.  
 Pilot research conducted by Surber, Huff, Brown, Doyon, Clark, and Hajnal 
(2018) found affordance primes to be slower than semantic features and non-associates in 
a reaction time task that used words as stimuli presented on a computer screen when 
asked to judge whether the meaning of the word is abstract or concrete. One possibility 
for the inferior performance of affordance primes might be the fact that affordances are 
typically encountered through our senses, and not linguistically. Consistent with this 
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notion, Snow, Skiba, Coleman, and Berryhill (2014) found that participants were able to 
remember more real-world objects compared to pictures of the same objects.  
Similarly, Chainay and Humphreys (2002) found that action knowledge is more 
relevant for pictures of objects compared with the name of the object. Participants were 
presented with objects as either pictures (line drawings) or words (name of object), and 
asked to perform one of two tasks (semantic categorization or action decision). 
Participants in the semantic categorization task were asked to decide if the object could 
commonly be found in a kitchen, while the instructions for the action decision task were 
to decide if the object was twistable or pourable. The authors found that participants were 
faster and more accurate for objects presented as pictures when the task was action 
oriented, while objects presented as words facilitated responding to the semantic task.  
To sum up, sensory information (pictures over words) is more relevant to action 
than to higher level cognition, and direct sensory information (seeing a real object) is 
processed faster than indirect sensory information (looking at photographs of objects). 
1.3 Overview of the Current Study 
For the present experiment, I hypothesized that visual information may be needed to 
facilitate the priming effects of affordances. Specifically, pictorial depictions of objects 
might be better suited for facilitating affordance-based priming than linguistic 
information such as reading a word on a computer screen. To test these hypotheses, I 
investigated the effects of priming (affordances, feature, or non-associate) on a semantic 
categorization task. In Experiment 1, a set of 81 object (target) and prime pairs were used 
as stimuli. Photographs of the objects were obtained from the Bank of Standardized 
Stimuli (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010). Participants were 
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assigned to either word or picture target conditions. Participants were presented with 
word primes followed by a target stimulus (word or picture). They were asked to decide 
if the stimuli (primes and targets) could fit inside of a shoebox (Bowers and Turner, 
2003). The shoebox task gives two advantages versus the abstract/concrete task used in 
Surber et al. (2018). First, because pictures are inherently concrete, this could provide an 
advantage for affordance processing over words in the abstract/concrete categorization 
task. Secondly, the shoebox task is more ecologically valid for testing affordances than 
abstract/concrete decisions because the shoebox task asks participants to make an action 
decision. In Experiment 2, the same 81 images from Experiment 1 were used. 
Participants were presented with a prime and then a visual image (target). Participants 
were again asked to decide if the presented stimuli could fit inside a shoebox. To 
determine how much visual information is needed to facilitate responding to various 
types of primes, pictures were manipulated so that some images appeared clear, slightly 
blurry, or very blurry. To further investigate how much information is needed to 
recognize an object was examined in Experiment 3. I wanted to discover what is the 
minimum amount of visual information that is necessary to recognize an object, and 
whether less information is needed to process affordances than semantic content. 
Participants were first presented with a prime word (affordance, semantic feature, or non-
associate). They were then presented with an artificially darkened screen so that features 
of the object were not visible initially, but then gradually became clearer. Participants 
were asked to identify the object as quickly as possible as the picture was becoming 
clearer. In sum, I argued that 1) affordances are optimally processed via perceptual 
information, not linguistically, 2) the quality of the perceptual information influences 
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processing of affordances, and 3) visual object recognition is faster and more efficient 
when primed with affordance features compared to semantic features.  
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CHAPTER II – Experiment 1 
2.1 Participants 
58 participants (36 females; Mage=20.44 years) from the University of Southern 
Mississippi participated for partial course credit. Participants were required to have 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and have no motor problems. A total of 62 
participants were gathered for this experiment, but 4 participants had to be excluded due 
to English not being their first language. 
2.2 Materials 
 Participants viewed the stimuli on a 30-inch color screen connected to a Windows 
10 laptop. Responses (button presses) were made on a CMSTORM quick fire rapid 
mechanical gaming keyboard. Answers were given by pressing the ‘F’ key for ‘Yes’ and 
the ‘J’ key for ‘No’. The stimuli were presented and button presses (response time) were 
controlled by E-Prime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). A black 
cardboard shoebox was always visible to participants. The shoebox dimensions were 
length 30cm × width 23cm × height 13cm. 
2.3 Design  
 Experiment 1 was a 2×3 factorial mixed design. The between-subjects 
independent variable was Stimulus type (pictures vs. words). Prime type (i.e., each 
participant saw targets primed with affordances, features, and non-associates) was a 
within-subject variable. The dependent variables for Experiment 1 were reaction time 
(defined as the time between the start of stimulus presentation to a button-press response) 
and accuracy (correct categorization with respect to fitting into a shoebox over the total 
number of responses per cell). To analyze the results a 2 (Stimulus type: pictures vs. 
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words) × 3 (Prime type: affordance, features, non-associates) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted. 
2.4 Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to view the target object as either a word or 
picture (see Figure 1). Participants in the word categorization task viewed the primes 
(affordance, semantic, non-associated) and targets (objects) as words. The picture 
categorization task had participants view primes as words and targets as pictures of 
objects. Participants sat in front of a computer monitor, while stimuli were presented. The 
shoebox sat beside the computer monitor, and for the duration of the experiment, 
participants could look at the shoebox at any point during a trial. Participants head 
movements were not restricted, with the exception that participants were required to 
remain a fixed distance from the screen at approximately 50 cm. Participants were 
acclimated to the task by completing 6 practice trials. Practice trials were identical to 
experimental trials.  
Each trial began with a fixation point (a ‘+’ sign in the middle of the screen) for 
1000 ms, followed by an inter-stimulus interval for 250 ms (Figure 1). Participants were 
then shown a prime associated with a target object. Participants were asked to decide if 
the presented prime could fit inside of a shoebox. If a prime was unable to be put inside 
of a box (i.e. sit), participants were instructed to respond no. Primes were shown until 
participants responded. A visual mask was then shown to participants for 1000 ms 
followed by an inter-stimulus interval for 250 ms. Target objects were then presented as 
either a word or picture depending on the assigned condition. Participants were asked to 
respond by deciding if the presented object could fit inside of a shoebox. Participants 
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were able to view objects until they made their decision. Responses to primes and targets 
were made continuously so that participants were not alerted to the relationship between 
primes and targets, and therefore had no knowledge of whether a stimulus was a prime or 
a target. Participants were asked to complete a short demographic and debriefing 
questionnaire with questions related to participant expectations and opinions of the 
experiment. Questionnaire answers were used to improve the design of the Experiment or 
to address possible demand characteristic issues. 
2.5 Data Analysis 
 All reaction times and accuracy data for Experiment 1 are based on an N=48 due 
to data loss related to problems with the E-Prime software. As a result, responses for 10 
participants were not recorded.  
2.6 Results 
 Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy by 
Stimulus and Prime type. The average reaction time was computed based on trials that 
resulted in correct responses. A main effect of Prime type was found on reaction times 
F(2,92)=3.194, p<.05, ŋp2= .07 (see Figure 2).  Objects primed with affordances were 
responded to significantly faster than objects primed with non-associates (F(1,46)=5.27, 
p=.03). No other comparisons were statistically significant. A main effect of Stimulus 
type was significant on accuracy F(1,46)=9.465, p<.01, ŋp2= .17 (see Figure 3), in which 
participants were more accurate for classifying pictures than words (p<.01). The Stimulus 
type by Prime type interaction was not significant for any of the dependent measures. 
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2.7 Discussion 
 Objects primed with affordances showed a priming effect for reaction times, 
compared to non-associated primes. Object primed with semantic primes did not show a 
priming effect compared to non-associated primes. Affordance primes provided an 
advantage for objects presented as pictures. This provides evidence that affordance 
perception is optimally processed through sensory experiences (i.e., the information 
available in photographs taken of real objects). This is also evident in the accuracy of 
responses for objects primed with affordances. This was not the case for objects 
presented as pictures, which showed equal accuracy for all prime types. One caveat for 
the accuracy of words (either prime or target) is that there is no guarantee that 
participants thought of the same sized object (i.e., the word ‘ball’ in the current 
experiment could be a tennis ball or a soccer ball). One possible reason for the failure to 
find an accuracy effect may be due to data loss, and consequently, due to low statistical 
power. 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated a clear benefit to affordance primes when the 
information was presented pictorially. What is the nature of the visual information and 
what are the limits on the amount of information necessary to sustain such performance? 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to manipulate the amount of visual information available 
to participants to try to answer this question. I reasoned that when presented visual 
information was degraded, affordance primes would produce superior (faster and more 
accurate) responses. The perception of affordances is an automatic process that should 
allow for participants to recognize objects quicker even when the object is presented as a 
low-quality image (i.e., blurred, with higher spatial frequencies removed). 
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CHAPTER III – Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, I sought to manipulate the amount and quality of visual 
information present in pictures. I predicted that affordance primes would produce faster 
responding to target objects compared to semantic and non-associate primes, even when 
visual information was of poor quality. 
3.1 Participants 
 68 (57 females; Mage=19.4 years) from the University of Southern Mississippi 
participated for partial course credit. Participants were required to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and have no motor problems. A total of 75 participants were 
gathered for this experiment, but 2 participants had to be excluded due to E-Prime 3.0 
crashing during data collection. Another 5 participants were removed from analysis due 
to distractions.   
3.2 Materials 
 Participants viewed the stimuli on a 30-inch color computer screen connected to a 
Windows 10 laptop. Responses (button presses) were performed on a gaming keyboard. 
The stimuli were presented and button presses (response time) were controlled by E-
Prime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). A shoebox was visible to 
participants throughout the experiment. Pictures were artificially blurred using the 
gaussian blur feature in Photoshop. This feature applied the Gaussian function (𝐺(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2
𝑒
−
𝑥2
2𝜎2) by a user specified amount (x) to every pixel of an image. The software 
allows the user to set up a radius (measured in pixels) to determine how far should the 
filter search for dissimilar pixels to blur. Pictures degraded with the extreme blur were 
transformed with a gaussian blur of 15 pixels (radius of blur area). The pictures in the 
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medium blur condition were transformed with a gaussian blur of 7.5 pixels. For examples 
of stimuli see Figure 4. 
3.3 Design 
 Experiment 2 was a mixed factorial design. Participants were presented with 81 
unique objects. Participants never saw the same object twice. The independent variables 
for Experiment 2 were Prime type (affordance, semantic, non-associate) and Image 
Quality (clear, medium blur, extreme blur). The dependent variables were reaction time 
(i.e., time from stimulus presentation to response button press) and accuracy 
(correct/total). To analyze the data a 3 (Image Quality) × 3 (Prime type) mixed effects 
ANOVA was computed on reaction time and accuracy.  
3.4 Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to view target objects that are either very 
blurry, somewhat blurry, or clear (see Figure 5). The primes were always presented as 
words, just like in Experiment 1. All other procedures were identical to those in 
Experiment 1.  
3.5 Results  
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for reaction times and accuracy. The average 
reaction time was computed based on trials that resulted in correct responses. Results 
showed a main effect of Prime type on reaction time F(2,130)=3.10, p<.05, ŋp2= .05 (see 
Figure 6). Post hoc analyses identified that objects primed with affordances were 
responded to faster than objects primed with non-associates (F(1,65)=4.53, p=.04). There 
was a significant main effect of Prime type on accuracy, F(2,130)=4.54, p=.012, ŋp2= .07 
(see Figure 7). Objects primed with affordances were categorized more accurately than 
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objects primed with non-associates (F(2,130)=10.63, p<.01). There was also a significant 
effect of Image Quality on accuracy F(2,65)=4.63, p=.01, ŋp2= .12. Participants were 
more accurate when the image quality was clear compared to the maximum blur (p<.01). 
3.6 Discussion 
 Results for Experiment 2 showed a significant priming effect for affordances. 
Objects primed with affordances were responded to faster than objects primed with non-
associates collapsed across image quality, replicating the reaction time results from 
Experiment 1. The accuracy results from Experiment 2 show that objects primed with 
affordances were responded to more accurately than objects primed with non-associates.  
The image quality manipulation did not significantly change the way primes and 
targets were responded to in terms of response time. A possible reason for the 
manipulation failure may have been due to the stimuli itself. Specifically, blurred images 
were presented as discrete static images. The perception of affordances is based on 
information patterns that embody changes in stimulus arrays (Gibson, 2014). Information 
emerges through changes in the optic array, which generates optic flow (Gibson, 1950; 
Koenderink, 1986). Because optic flow contains dynamic patterns over time, perception 
is dynamic and not based on perceiving a series of static snapshots of stimulus arrays. 
Therefore, the goal of Experiment 3 was to manipulate the amount of information given 
to participants through dynamically changing stimuli (an image that gradually shows 
more object features). I predicted that affordance primes would allow participants to 
respond to target objects at higher levels of blur faster than other primes (semantic and 
non-associated).    
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CHAPTER IV – Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 showed a significant priming effect of affordance on reaction time 
and accuracy. To get a more accurate measure of the amount of information needed by 
participants to make the categorization decision I used a continuous measure of image 
blur. In Experiment 3 objects were fully blurred and gradually revealed more features to 
participants. Participants were asked to respond as soon as they recognized the objects. 
This could, in principle, provide a better measure of the amount of information needed 
for perceiving affordances, but it should not necessarily benefit object recognition. This 
prediction is also consistent with Gibson’s conjecture that information that specifies 
perception is dynamic, not static.  
4.1 Participants 
44 (36 females; Mage=20.69 years) from the University of Southern Mississippi 
participated for partial course credit. Participants were required to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and have no motor problems. 
4.2 Materials 
 Participants viewed the stimuli on a 30-inch color screen connected to a Windows 
10 laptop. Responses (button presses) were done on a gaming keyboard. The stimuli were 
presented and button presses (response time) were controlled by E-Prime 3.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). A shoebox was visible to participants throughout the 
experiment. Photographs used in Experiment 3 were altered in Photoshop. Image 
transitions were created by reducing gaussian blur from 25 px to 0 px over a 10 second 
period. Example of stimuli are shown in Figure 8. 
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4.3 Design 
 Experiment 3 employed a within-subject design. Participants viewed primes 
(words) and objects (pictures). The independent variable for Experiment 3 was Prime 
Type (affordance, semantic feature, non-associates). Reaction times and accuracy were 
used as dependent variables. To analyze the data a within-subjects repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on reaction times using Prime type as the independent variable 
with 3 levels (affordance, semantic, non-associate). A separate ANOVA was conducted 
on accuracy. Percent blur was not analyzed due to its perfect correlation with reaction 
time.  
4.4 Procedure 
 Procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1 except for target stimuli (see 
Figure 9). For Experiment 3, target objects were presented as a completely blurred image 
that would ‘fade in’ to a clear image without any blur. The fade-in started at 100% blur 
(completely black screen) and gradually became a completely clear (0% blur) picture in 
10 seconds. The speed of the fading in from a completely blurry image to a completely 
clear image was kept constant. Participants were asked to make their responses as soon as 
they were able to make their decision.  
4.5 Results 
 Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy. 
The average reaction time was computed based on trials that resulted in correct 
responses. There was a marginally significant effect of Prime type on reaction time F(2, 
86)=2.96, p=.06, ŋp2=.06 (see Figure 10). This marginal effect was carried by the 
apparent priming effect, i.e. the difference between semantic and non-associate prime 
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trials (based on LSD-pairwise comparison, p=.03). The difference between affordance 
primes and non-associate primes was approaching significance (LSD comparison, p=.06).  
There was no main effect for Prime type on accuracy F(2, 88)=0.54, p=.58, ŋp2=.01 (see 
Figure 11).  
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CHAPTER V – Discussion Section 
One of the goals of this research was to clarify the puzzling findings from Surber 
et al. (2018) showing that affordance primes inhibited responding to target objects 
(words). In that study the task was to judge abstractness versus concreteness of the target 
object. I reasoned that neither the stimuli (words) nor the task were not favorable to 
affordance perception due to being outside the domain of perceptual processing. It is 
plausible to assume that affordances are optimally perceived through sensory experiences 
(Experiment 1), and not via linguistic or abstract semantic processes. This means that 
perceptual information should be necessary to facilitate responding to target objects 
primed with affordances (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002). Specifically, affordance 
perception may not be activated by the abstract nature of words. I tested this hypothesis 
by using pictures as target stimuli.  
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants were able to respond to target 
objects quicker and more accurately when they were primed with an associated 
affordance. This implies that affordances are processed differently than regular semantic 
features. Specifically, affordances seem better suited for visual stimuli, while semantic 
features are better suited for linguistic stimuli. This is supported by Glenberg’s (1997) 
theory of embodied memory. Glenberg’s theory is founded on the idea that memory and 
cognition guide perception and action. This means that the way that I process our 
environments is based on the relationship between what our bodies are capable of and the 
ways the environment constrains behavior. He further theorized that our memories are 
not formed by association in the traditional manner, but rather through patterns of actions 
connecting one idea to another. This could explain why affordance primes did not work 
 22 
with linguistic stimuli. Because language does not afford behavior in the same way that 
tangible stimuli do (i.e. actual environment/objects) any associations between affordances 
and linguistic information is weak. This also helps explain why a more perceptually 
relevant stimulus such as a picture was needed to facilitate affordance priming. 
 Carter, Hough, Stuart, and Rastatter (2011) found that the longer the inter-
stimulus interval between trials the weaker the priming effects. This could explain the 
non-significant effects for Experiment 3. Specifically, because average reaction times 
were around 8 seconds, priming effects were weakened by the time participants 
responded to targets. To investigate this, confound a future study should be conducted 
applying the experimental manipulation from Experiment 3 using a shorter fade-in 
timeline. Participants would view targets that fade in from 100% blur to 0% blur in 5 
seconds. Participants would be given a response deadline of 1.5 seconds, before the 
object disappears. This is comparable to average response times obtained in Experiments 
1 and 2. Participants would still be able to respond after the object disappears but would 
only have a limited time to view the object. This should improve the strength of the 
priming effect.  
 Another future goal would be to create a stimulus that is more ecologically valid 
than linguistic information. Language may be too abstract to evoke the information 
necessary for affordance perception processes. The current series of experiments have 
shown that pictures of objects are sufficient to stimulate affordance perception; however, 
pictures do not provide information that can only be accessed through a dynamic 
perceptual stimulus such as real-world objects moving in space in the context of a 
behaviorally meaningful task. Real-world objects are better remembered (Snow et al., 
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2014) and processed differently (Snow et al, 2011) than pictures. This means that there is 
meaning lost when an object is photographed. An ultimate test of this observation is to 
design a real-world replication of Experiment 1, in which targets are presented as either 
pictures or the actual object involved in task-specific motion.  
 It is also not clear what the exact nature of information is, and how much 
information is necessary to perceive affordances. The literature on biological motion 
offers some suggestions on this problem. Movement patterns recorded of human activity 
using point light displays are sufficient to specify what said activity is (Johansson, 1873). 
For example, lights attached to joints of the body and recorded as a person performs an 
action uniquely identify whether a person is walking, running, or doing some other 
activity. The information is dynamic, complex, and can typically be perceived over time 
as the pattern changes (Johansson, 1975). Static snapshots of such visual patterns are hard 
to recognize, but as soon as they are set into motion, the correlated movement patterns 
reveal the dynamic activity that is performed. For example, limb motion during 
hammering creates a very different visual pattern than limb motion when one hits a tennis 
ball with a racquet. I can recognize these patterns of action accurately and are able to 
determine characteristics about the actor (i.e. gender) or the action from only the motion 
in a point light display (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983).  Future studies should utilize 
stimuli created with point light displays. Adding or removing the number of visible points 
tracking movement might provide the ultimate answer to the questions that were raised in 
Experiment 3 about the richness of informational components necessary to support visual 
perception of affordances.    
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APPENDIX A – Tables 
Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics Experiment 1 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Reaction Time (in milliseconds) and Accuracy 
(proportion of correct responses) in Experiment 1. 
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Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics Experiment 2 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Reaction Times and Accuracy in Experiment 2. 
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Table A.3 Descriptive Statistics Experiment 3 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for Reaction Times and Accuracy in Experiment 3. 
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APPENDIX B – Figures 
 
Figure B.1  Timeline for Each Trial Sequence in Experiment 1 
Participants were presented with either an affordance, semantic, or non-associated prime, 
followed by the target object presented as either a word or picture.  
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Figure B.2 Reaction Times Experiment 1 
Mean reaction times for categorization decision by stimulus type. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure B.3 Accuracy Experiment 1 
Mean accuracy for categorization decision by stimulus type. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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Figure B.4 Examples of Stimuli for Experiment 2 
Objects were presented at the three different blur levels in Experiment 2. Participants saw 
all objects at only one of the three types of blur. 
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Figure B.5 Timeline for Each Trial Sequence in Experiment 2 
Participants were presented with either an affordance-, semantic-, or non-associated 
prime. This was followed by a picture of the target stimulus object at one of the three 
image quality levels.  
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Figure B.6 Reaction Times Experiment 2 
Mean reaction times for categorization decision by image quality in Experiment 2. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
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Figure B.7 Accuracy Experiment 2 
Mean accuracy for categorization decision by image quality in Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure B.8 Examples of Stimuli for Experiment 3 
Objects as they transition from blurry (Gaussian blur of 25 pixel radius) to clear in 
Experiment 3. Participants responded when they recognized the object. 
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Figure B.9 Timeline for Each Trial Sequence in Experiment 3 
Participants were presented with either an affordance, semantic, or non-associated prime. 
Pictures of associated objects start out completely blurred and slowly become clear. 
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Figure B.10 Reaction Times Experiment 3 
Mean reaction times for categorization decision for prime types in Experiment 3. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure B.11 Accuracy Experiment 3 
Mean accuracy for categorization decision by for prime types. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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